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Abstract
This article discusses one of the most controversial yet important modes of liability
in international criminal law: joint criminal enterprise (JCE). One such controversy
is whether Third Category JCE can serve as a basis for genocide convictions.
To answer this question one needs to uncover the nature and origins of JCE.
It is submitted that convictions for genocide based upon the application of
Third Category JCE are justifiable. This contention stems from the premise that
JCE is a form of criminal participation to which principles of derivative liability
apply. However, such an approach is only valid when JCE is stripped to its core and
applied as a small-scale group crime, which requires proof of a direct link between
co-perpetrators. Moreover, in the case of Third Category JCE, a participant should
be convicted of participating in genocide, which would carry a lower sentence than
committing genocide as a participant in a First or Second Category JCE.
1. Introduction
This article discusses one of the most controversial yet important modes
of liability in international criminal law, joint criminal enterprise (JCE).
The concept of JCE has provided the legal basis for many convictions at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
increasingly plays a similar role at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR).Yet, there is considerable uncertainty as to its scope and there
are conflicting views as to its nature. For this reason, JCE liability and its
application to the crime of genocide remain as contentious as they are
undetermined.
What follows is an attempt to resolve these uncertainties by uncovering
the nature and origins of JCE. This requires a retracing of the development
of JCE in international law and an examination of national equivalents.
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Only after having clarified JCE’s origins, subsequent development and position
in the overall picture of criminal participation can one attempt to answer the
central question: can JCE form a basis for genocide convictions?
2. JCE in Past and Present International Case Law
A. Past
Prosecutors and judges at the military commissions and tribunals set up after
the Second World War relied on a ‘group crime concept’, in addition to the
theory of accomplice liability, in prosecuting and convicting Nazi supporters
who had been involved in mob violence against the Allied military and resis-
tance forces. They based criminal liability on the concept of ‘acting with a
common design’ derived from English criminal law. Common design liability
as interpreted in these proceedings, required proof of an awareness on the part
of the defendant (mens rea) that in some way his/her conduct contributed to the
crime (actus reus).1 The physical element was very vague, being loosely limited
to the condition that the accused’s cooperation in the war machine had a ‘real
bearing’ on the crime.2 Liability under the common design theory requires a
lower degree of participation than accomplice liability, which calls for a sub-
stantial effect on the crime by the principal offender. Moreover, according to
the common design theory, distinguishing between perpetrator and accom-
plice is irrelevant, as all the defendants are regarded as participants in the
crime. The ‘common design’ concept was relied upon to convict concentration
camp personnel3 and those involved in mob violence.4
B. Present
History appears to have repeated itself in The Hague. The ICTYdevised a group
liability concept to prosecute and convict those involved in collective crimes.
The Tadic¤ case illustrates this.While the Trial Chamber in Tadic¤ found that the
accused could not be sentenced for the killing of five men in the village of
Jaski¤ ci since there was no evidence that he had taken part in these killings,5
the Appeals Chamber, by relying on the concept of common purpose,
1 SeeWerner Rohde & Eight Others United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of War
Criminals (UNWCC) (London: HMO 1947^1949), Vol. V, 56; Bruno Tesch & Others (Zyklon B case)
UNWCC,Vol. I, at 101.
2 MaxWielen & Seventeen Others (Stalag Luft III case) UNWCC,Vol. XI, 46.
3 Martin Gottfried Weiss & Thirty-Nine Others (Dachau Concentration Camp case) UNWCC, Vol. XI,
5^17.
4 Otto Sandrock & three others case UNWCC, Vol. IV, 40; Erich Heyer & Six Others (The Essen
Lynching case) cited in Judgment,Tadic¤ (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (hereinafter
Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment), xx 204^209; Kurt Goebell et al. (The Borkum island cases) cited in Tadic¤
Appeal Judgment, xx 210^213.
5 Opinion and Judgment, Tadic¤ (IT-94-1-T), Trial Chamber II, 7 May 1997 (hereinafter Tadic¤
Judgment), x373.
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convicted Tadic¤ . According to the Appeals Chamber, relevant case law shows
that common purpose, later referred to as ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’, encom-
passes three distinct categories of crimes.6 Tadic¤ was held responsible under
the Third Category, representing the lowest level of involvement. In sharing the
intent to remove people from Jaski¤ ci, he was found to be equally responsible
for the five deaths since they were perpetrated in the course of the removal and
could be considered a predictable consequence of the removal.
All three categories distinguished by the Trial Chamber, a basic form
(First Category JCE), a systematic form (Second Category JCE) and an extended
form (Third Category JCE) of common purpose/JCE, require evidence of:
(i) a plurality of persons organised in a military, political or administrative structure,
(ii) the existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the
commission of a crime provided for in the Statute,
(iii) participation in that plan/common design (actus reus).7
With regard to mens rea, the First and Second Category JCE require ‘an inten-
tion to participate in and further the criminal activity or purpose of the group’,
thus suggesting that all participants possess the same intent, whereas a
participant in a Third Category JCE can be held responsible for crimes
falling outside the joint criminal enterprise, provided: (i) it was foreseeable
that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group
and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk.8 In the latter case, dolus eventualis
or advertent recklessness suffices as the requisite mental element.
Tadic¤ could not have been convicted for the five deaths at Jaski¤ ci on the
basis of accomplice liability provided for in Article 7(1) as ‘aiding and
abetting . . . in a crime’. The prosecution would have had to prove that Tadic¤
had carried out acts specifically directed at assisting, encouraging or lending
moral support to the killings while the support must have had a substantial
effect on the underlying crime.9 As with post Second World War case law,
a group crime concept was relied upon in prosecuting those involved in mob
violence.
6 (i) The first category relates to cases where all co-defendants possessing the same intent
pursue a common criminal design, for instance the killing of a certain person.
(ii) The second category concerns the so-called ‘concentration camp’ cases, where the requisite
actus reus comprises the active participation in the enforcement of a system of repression,
as it could be inferred from the position of authority and the specific functions held by
each accused. The mens rea element comprises: (i) knowledge of the nature of the system
and (ii) the intent to further the common concerted design to ill treat inmates. Intent may
also be inferred from the accused position within the camp.
(iii) The third category concerns cases where ‘one of the perpetrators commits an act which,
while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable conse-
quence of the effecting of that common purpose’. Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4,
x 204.
7 Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, x 228.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., x192.
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In the Tribunals’ case law, JCE has not only been used to prosecute and
convict those engaged in group crime and mob violence. This liability mode
has been used in prosecuting the auctor intellectualis, those political and
military superiors masterminding international crimes. The most conspicuous
example of this prosecutorial policy was the case against Slobodan Milos evic¤ .
10
Another is the Krajis nik case, where the Trial Chamber convicted a former
member of the Bosnian Serb leadership for committing crimes through partci-
pation in a JCE that involved Karadz ic¤ and other Bosnian Serb leaders.
11
From a prosecutorial point of view, JCE has appeal because it captures
an array of criminal conduct of those who knowingly participate in the
criminal endeavour.12 Because of the higher evidentiary standards for superior
responsibility, which often features as the subsidiary mode of liability on the
indictment of those accused in superior positions,13 and because of the limits
of accomplice liability, JCE became the preferred liability theory of international
prosecutors. In the absence of a general conspiracy concept (i.e. applicable
to crimes against humanity and war crimes as well), by filling a gap left
by accomplice liability and by taking over superior responsibility’s role in
prosecuting senior defendants, JCE rapidly developed into the most important
liability mode at the ICTY.
3. Joint Criminal Enterprise ç a Controversial Concept
The concept of JCE, as developed by the ICTY, has evoked strong criticism
from practitioners, academics and even from one of the ICTY judges. Judge
Per-Johan Lindholm in his Separate Opinion to the Simic¤ judgment wrote:
‘I dissociate myself from the concept or doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in
this case as well as generally . . .The concept or ‘doctrine’ has caused confusion
and a waste of time, and is in my opinion of no benefit to the work of the
Tribunal or the development of international criminal law.’14
10 Indictment (‘Bosnia Herzegovina’), Milos evic¤ (IT-01-51-I), x 5^31; First Amended Indictment
(‘Croatia’) Milos evic¤ (IT-02-54-T), x 5^33; Second Amended Indictment Slobodan Milos evic¤ ,
Milan Milutinovic¤ , Nikola Sainovic¤ , Dragoljub Ojdanic¤ ,Vlajiko Stojiljkovic¤ (IT-99-37-PT), x16^29:
11 Judgment, Krajis nik (IT-00-39-T), Trial Chamber I, 27 September 2006 (hereinafter Krajis nik
Judgment).
12 See J.S. Martinez and A.M. Danner ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’ 93 California Law Review
(2005) 75, at 102^120.
13 Superior responsibility requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that superiors have effective
control over their subordinates (functional element), that they had information within their
possession that would have put them on notice of the crimes (allegedly) committed by sub-
ordinates (cognitive element) and that they failed to prevent or punish the crimes (operational
element). This relates especially to the hierarchical structure or chain of command between
senior (political) figures and the actual perpetrators (local war lords and paramilitary units)
and the knowledge of, and effective control over, every single crime are elements, which in
practice are difficult to prove.
14 Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm, Judgment,
Simic¤ (IT-95-9-T),Trial Chamber II, 17 October 2003, x 2^5.
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In the following, some of this ‘confusion’ will be highlighted. Bearing in
mind the vast case law relating to JCE liability, this account is by no means
exhaustive. The reference to cases below is merely illustrative.
A. Controversy over Scope
The JCE concept has been criticized for extending the limits of individual
criminal responsibility. In particular, the Second and Third Categories JCE
have been censured as bordering on collective responsibility, since the punish-
ment exceeds the actual contribution to the commission of a crime.
Second Category JCE deals with crimes committed within a system of ill-
treatment, such as in a detention camp. The Tadic¤ Appeals Chamber held that the
actus reus, the active participation in the enforcement of the system of ill treat-
ment, could be inferred from the position of authority within the camp.15 This is a
broad test, especially when one bears in mind that mens rea, personal knowledge
of the system of ill treatment, may be proved by ‘a matter of reasonable inference
from the accused’s position of authority’.16 As a result, criminal responsibility
would be primarily based on a person’s position, which would violate fundamental
principles of criminal law such as the maxim ‘no culpability without personal
fault’. The Krnojelac Trial Chamber refused to apply the ‘inference test’ of Second
Category JCE and relied on the requirements of the basic First Category JCE
instead.17 The Kvoc ka Trial Chamber, however, welcomed the systematic Second
Category JCE while accepting that the Second World War concentration camp
cases ‘[e]stablish a rebuttable presumption that holding an executive, administra-
tive, or protective role in a camp constitutes general participation in the camp
therein’.18 As one commentator argues, relying on Second Category JCE seems to
entail a shift in the burden of proof with regard to knowledge and intent.19
Third Category JCE has been met with equal suspicion, mostly by ‘outsiders’.
Danner and Martinez argue that the extended form of JCE, i.e. Third Category
JCE, may result in guilt by association because liability may attach to low-level
members of the JCE for all the crimes perpetrated by the enterprise.20 Osiel is
arguably even more critical than Danner and Martinez, observing that JCE
liability ‘[l]ures international law to a point where liability threatens to
exceed the scope of moral culpability’.21
15 Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, x 203.
16 Ibid., x 228.
17 Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-97-25-T), Trial Chamber I, 15 March 2002, x 78 (hereinafter Krnojelac
Judgment).
18 Judgment, Kvoc ka (IT-98-30/1-T), Trial Chamber I, 2 November 2001, x 278 (hereinafter Kvoc ka
Judgment).
19 V. Haan, ‘The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 5 International Criminal Law Review (2005)
167^2001, at 190.
20 Martinez and Danner, supra note 12, at 137.
21 M.J. Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity’, 105 Columbia Law
Review (2005) 1751^1862, at 1772.
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There have been efforts at the ICTY to prevent JCE liability from
over-expanding. The Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac found that using JCE
as a mode of liability ‘[r]equires a strict definition of common purpose’, while
the principal perpetrators who physically commit the crime ‘should be defined
as precisely as possible’.22 With regard to Second Category JCE, the Kvoc ka
Appeals Chamber ruled that under certain circumstances evidence may be
required to prove that the accused made a ‘substantial contribution’ to the
joint criminal enterprise.23
The most recent attempt to limit JCE liability is the Trial Chamber judgment
in Br danin.24 The Trial Chamber determined that JCE liability requires proof of
an agreement between the ‘physical’/actual perpetrator and the ‘non-physical’
perpetrator/participant in a JCE. This link must be further specified. Moreover,
proof of an agreement between ‘non-physical’ perpetrators among themselves;
for instance, the leadership of the SerBiH, does not fulfil the ‘agreement
requirement’ of JCE liability.25 If upheld on appeal, JCE may no longer be
used as a liability theory in large-scale enterprises with defendants who are
structurally far removed from the actual scene of the crimes. It is hardly
surprising that the Trial Chamber in Milos evic¤ ordered amicus curiae
observations on the issue of JCE and superior responsibility.26
B. Controversy over Nature
From the very beginning, when JCE/common purpose was introduced
as a mode of liability, its nature has been hotly contested. Is it a species of
perpetration, or was it a form of complicity/accomplice liability/criminal
participation?
The Tadic¤ Appeals Chamber treated JCE ambivalently. On the one hand, the
chamber brought the concept under the heading ‘committing’ and distin-
guished it from aiding and abetting a crime, which, it held, is generally
couched in terms of ‘participating’ in an offence27 and which was found to
‘[u]nderstate the degree of criminal responsibility’.28 On the other hand,
it referred to common purpose/JCE as ‘a form of accomplice liability’.29
22 Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-97-25-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2003, x 116 (hereinafter
Krnojelac Appeal Judgment).
23 Judgment, Kvoc ka (IT-98-30/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 28 February 2005, x 97 (hereinafter
Kvoc ka Appeal Judgment).
24 See for an elaborate account and commentary: K. Gustafson, ‘The Requirement of an ‘‘Express
Agreement’’ for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability’ in this Symposium.
25 Judgment, Br d anin (IT-99-36-T), Trial Chamber I, 1 September 2004, x 347 (hereinafter
Br danin Judgment).
26 Order on Amicus Curiae observations proprio motu on the desirability of submissions on the
alternative basis of individual criminal responsibility alleged in the case and on the issue of
trials in absentia, Milos evic¤ (IT-02-54-T), 1 July 2005.
27 In this it relied on the text of Art. 2(3)(c) of the International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombing, See Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, x 221.
28 Ibid., x192
29 Ibid., x 220.
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To complicate matters even further, the Appeals Chamber used the terms
‘perpetrator’and ‘co-perpetrator’ to refer to a participant in a JCE.30
The ambivalence over common purpose/JCE can be traced to its hybrid
civil/common law heritage. Co-perpetration is a civil law concept that is used to
distinguish those who are closely involved in committing a crime from
those merely assisting the commission of a crime. The latter contribution to the
crime is subject to a lower maximum sentence. This categorization of offenders
was introduced into theTribunals’case law along the lines of civil law. In contrast,
JCE as such was thought to be a form of common law accomplice liability.
As a result of the confusion over perpetration and JCE, the two concepts have
been subject to competing interpretations in subsequent decisions and judgments.
The courts have neither consistently applied nor disregarded the distinction
between types of offenders. Judge Hunt, in his separate opinion to the Odjanic¤
jurisdiction decision, criticized the attempt to categorize different types of
offenders. He was of the view that:
No such distinction exists in relation to sentencing in this Tribunal, and I believe that it is
unwise for this Tribunal to attempt to categorise different types of offenders in this way
when it is unnecessary to do so for sentencing purposes. The Appeals Chamber has made it
clear elsewhere that a convicted person must be punished for the seriousness of the acts
which he has done, whatever their categorisation.31
The Krnojelac Trial Chamber32 did ‘[n]ot accept the validity of the distinc-
tion . . .between a co-perpetrator and an accomplice’33 but adopted the
expression co-perpetrator ‘for convenience’ when referring to a participant
in a JCE. The Krnojelac Trial Chamber made a point in stating that it considered
a coperpetrator to be an accomplice and not a principal offender.34 However,
the Krstic¤ and Kvoc ka Trial Chambers readily accepted the distinction between
co-perpetrators and aiders and abettors.35
C. Controversy overApplicability
The biggest controversy relating to JCE is whether its extended form can apply
to a special intent crime such as genocide. Can a participant in a Third
Category JCE be held responsible for the commission of genocide when
genocidal crimes have been committed as a natural and foreseeable
consequence of a JCE? This is a question of mens rea. While genocide requires
evidence of a dolus specialis, i.e. the intent to destroy in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, Third Category JCE requires
30 Ibid., x192.
31 Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Ojdanic¤ to Jurisdiction Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Milutonovic¤ et al. (IT-99-37-AR72), 21 May 2003, x31.
32 This Trial Chamber was presided over by Judge David Hunt.
33 Krnojelac Judgment, supra note 17, x77.
34 Ibid.
35 Judgment, Krstic¤ (IT-98-33-T), Trial Chamber I, 2 August 2001, xx 643^645 (hereinafter Krstic¤
Judgment); Kvoc ka Judgment, supra note 18, x 284.
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dolus eventualis/advertent recklessness adopting a foresight test.When the Trial
Chamber in Krstic¤ convicted Krstic¤ as a participant in a Third Category enter-
prise, it substituted the genocide requirement for the highest degree of intent,
dolus specialis with the lowest degree of intent, dolus eventualis. This seems to be
an incoherent construction. The Appeals Chamber in Krstic¤ did not pronounce
clearly on the issue when it entered a conviction for aiding and abetting in
genocide instead.36 The Trial Chamber in Stakic¤ , however, did when it ruled:
Conflating the third variant of joint criminal enterprise and the crime of genocide would
result in the dolus specialis being so watered down that it is extinguished. Thus, the Trial
Chamber finds that in order to ‘commit’genocide, the elements of that crime, including the
dolus specialis must be met. The notions of ‘escalation’ to genocide, or genocide as a ‘natural
and foreseeable consequence’ of an enterprise not aimed specifically at genocide are not
compatible with the definition of genocide under Article 4(3)(a).37
The Trial Chamber in Br danin took a similar approach in its 98bis decision.38
However, the decision was reversed on appeal. The Appeals Chamber held that,
as a mode of criminal liability, Third Category JCE is no different from other
forms of criminal liability that do not require proof of full intent to commit a
crime before liability can attach. As with aiding and abetting, and superior
responsibility, knowledge suffices.39 An accused can be held responsible for
committing genocide where genocide is a natural and foreseeable consequence
of his acts. This view was adopted by the Trial Chamber in Milos evic¤ .
40
However, as Mettraux rightfully points out, the decision of the Appeals
Chamber in Br d anin does not provide any precedential authority such that
the question whether Third Category JCE can provide the basis for genocide
convictions remains debatable and unsettled.41
4. Genocidal Intent
A. Purpose-based versus Knowledge-based
Ever since the Akayesu judgment, the ad hoc Tribunals have interpreted
genocidal intent as dolus specialis. There, the Trial Chamber held that,
‘special intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a constitutive
element of the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to
produce the act charged’. This interpretation, which may be termed a
36 Judgment, Krstic¤ (IT-98-33-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, xx135^144 (hereinafter Krstic¤
Appeal Judgment).
37 Judgment, Stakic¤ (IT-97-24),Trial Chamber II, 31 July 2003, x530 (hereinafter Stakic¤ Judgment).
38 Rule 98bis Decision, Br danin (IT-99-36-T),Trial Chamber, 28 November 2003, x29 (hereinafter
Br danin 98bis Decision).
39 Decision on InterlocutoryAppeal, Br danin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 March 2004, x7
(hereinafter Br danin InterlocutoryAppeal Decision).
40 Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Milos evic¤ (IT-54-02-T), Trial Chamber, 16 June
2004, x 291 (hereinafter Milos evic¤ Decision on Acquittal).
41 G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford: OUP, 2005), at 265.
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purpose-based interpretation,42 has been adopted in subsequent ICTR rulings
and in the ICTYappellate judgment in Krstic¤ .43
However, the purpose-based interpretation has been challenged. At the
ICTY, prosecutors have objected to it, arguing that it sets too high a standard.44
In scholarly writing, this complaint has resounded. Commentators have
argued that genocide should comprise those acts that one knows lead to the
destruction of a group,45 or whose foreseeable or probable consequence is the
destruction of a group.46 This approach, the ‘knowledge-based interpretation’
of genocidal intent, was proposed by Greenawalt already in 1999.47 Recently,
Kress has suggested that the International Criminal Court (ICC) judges adopt
the knowledge-based approach, proposing they take a fresh look at the matter
and ignore the purpose-based interpretation of the ad hoc Tribunals.48 Kress
argues that the latter should be regarded as not having been settled by the case
law of the ICTYand the ICTR.49 This seems to be a bold statement.
Kress’ plea for a knowledge-based approach to genocidal intent is appealing.
He criticizes the inverse relationship between the actus reus and mens rea of
genocide brought about by the purpose-based approach. Genocide connotes
collective activity of a group which ‘[c]annot simply be combined with
a mental requirement that is more typical for the leadership level without
running into conceptual problems’. His suggestion to remedy this incoherence
by adopting the knowledge-based standard is a principled and attractive
way out of some of the conceptual problems encountered when prosecuting
individuals for genocide. Kress proposes that genocidal intent require
(a) knowledge of a collective attack directed to the destruction of at least
part of a protected group and (b) dolus eventualis as regards the occurrence
of such destruction.50
In arguing in favour of a knowledge-based approach, Kress points out that it
is already part of ICTY and ICTR case law, albeit not explicitly. The Tribunals’
practice of inferring genocidal intent from a pattern of conduct introduces
a knowledge-based approach ‘through the evidential backdoor’.51 In Akayesu,
42 C. Kress, ‘The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2005) 562^578, at 566.
43 Krstic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, x134.
44 Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, Jelis ic¤ (IT-95-10-A), at x 4 and 22; See Judgment on Defence Motions
to Acquit, Sikirica (IT-95-8-T),Trial Chamber III, 3 September 2001, x 27.
45 A.K.A. Greenawalt, ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-based
Interpretation’, 99 Columbia Law Review (1999) 2259^2295, at 2288; H. Vest, Genozid durch
organisatorische Machtapparate (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002) 104 et seq.
(referred to by Kress, supra note 42).
46 E. David, Principes de droit des conflits arme¤ s (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999), at 615; Kress, supra
note 42, 562^578; A. Gil Gil, Derecho Penal Internacional: Especial consideraci¤ on del delitto de
genocide (Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 1999), 259 et seq. (referred to by Kress).
47 Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 2259.
48 Kress, supra note 42, 562^578.
49 Ibid., at 578.
50 Ibid., at 577.
51 Ibid., at 571^572.
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the Trial Chamber held that genocidal intent could be inferred from ‘[t]he
high number of atrocities committed against the Tutsi, their widespread
nature . . . and . . . the fact that the victims were systematically and deliberately
selected’. Jrgensen understandably wonders whether this truly satisfies the
specific intent requirement or is only sufficient to prove knowledge.52
Moreover, some of the Tribunals’ findings on dolus specialis remain ambiguous
and in Krstic¤ the Appeals Chamber failed to clarify these ambiguities.53 In this
light, Kress’s statement seems less bold.
Nevertheless, the formula used by the Tribunals insists on a purpose-based
interpretation of genocidal intent for principal perpetrators and this cannot
be ignored.54 The ad hoc Tribunals were the first international criminal
tribunals to apply the Genocide Convention and, as a result, have significantly
contributed to the development of the concept. Therefore, it is not possible
to simply brush aside their interpretation of genocidal intent. Moreover,
the purpose-based approach finds support in the travaux pre¤ paratoires of the
Genocide Convention and national law concepts reflecting general principles
of law. The latter may not necessarily be couched in terms of ‘special intent’,
but concepts that have a similar theoretical structure as ‘purpose-based’
genocide exist.55
Against this background, it is questionable whether or not the ICC has the
liberty to take a ‘fresh look’ and redefine genocidal intent. Having said that,
the ambiguity of some of the Tribunals’ findings and the inference test
leave the impression of a half-hearted approach towards the purpose-based
interpretation of genocidal intent. A better solution may be for the ICTY
and ICTR appellate judges to pronounce with greater clarity on the issue of
genocidal intent and reformulate some of their findings in a coordinated effort
to explain dolus specialis for JCE in genocide cases.
B. Complicity and Aiding and Abetting
In Krstic¤ , the ICTYAppeals Chamber found Krstic¤ guilty of aiding and abetting
genocide. The Appeals Chamber was of the view that an aider/abettor does not
need to share the specific intent to commit genocide, it is sufficient that the
accused rendered substantial assistance to the commission of the crime
52 N.H.B. Jrgensen, ‘The Definition of Genocide: Joining the Dots in the Light of Recent Practice’,
1 International Criminal Law Review (2002) 285^313, at 298.
53 Consider, for instance, x571 of the Krstic¤ Trial Chamber, where the Trial Chamber required the
perpetrator would act ‘[w]ith the goal of destroying all or part of a group’and xx 622 and 634
where it was sufficient that the accused was aware of the overall genocidal activity. Krstic¤
Judgment, supra note 35. See Kress, supra note 42, at 566 and E.Van Sliedregt, Commentary to
Krstic¤ Judgment, in A. Klip and G. Sluiter, Annotated Leading Cases VII (Antwerpen, Oxford,
NewYork: Intersentia, 2005) 767^772.
54 See Krstic¤ Judgment, supra note 35, x571, and Krstic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, x134.
55 In its essence, special intent is a purpose-oriented intent, distinguishable from general intent
by requiring the actor to desire a particular purpose See O. Triffterer, ‘Genocide, Its Particular
Intent to Destroy inWhole or in Part the Group as Such’, 14 Leiden Journal of International Law
(2001) 399^408, at 403^404.
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knowing the intent behind the crime.56 In Blagojevic¤ & Jokic¤ this ruling was
endorsed. The Trial Chamber held that aiding and abetting genocide requires
that the accused (i) carried out an act which consisted of practical assistance,
encouragement or moral support to the principal that had ‘substantial effect’
on the commission of the crime; (ii) had knowledge that his or her own acts
assisted in the commission of the specific crime by the principal offender
and (iii) knew that the crime was committed with specific intent.57
There has been confusion at both the ICTR and the ICTY on the interpreta-
tion of ‘aiding and abetting genocide’ and ‘complicity in genocide’. The
former is encapsulated as a mode of non-genocidal liability in Article 6(1)/7(1)
of the ICTR/Y Statutes; the latter is penalized as a form of genocide in
Article 2/4(3)(e) of the ICTR/Y Statutes. Anglo-American complicity law, on
which the ICTY and ICTR provisions on criminal responsibility are modelled,
provides that ‘aiding and abetting’ are just two ways in which an accessory
assists in the commission of an offence and can subsequently be held liable for
complicity in the crime.58 The question arises whether, and if so, how, aiding
and abetting and other notions of complicity differ.
The main issue of contention has been whether the mens rea for ‘complicity
in genocide’ and the mens rea for ‘aiding and abetting genocide’ require proof
of dolus specialis/special genocidal intent or whether the ‘reduced’ mens rea
standard of knowledge of genocidal intent suffices. After a series of contra-
dictory judgments at both the ICTY and the ICTR on this issue,59 the recent
appellate judgments at the ICTY in the Krstic¤ case and at the ICTR in the
Ntakirutimana case seemed to have settled the matter, at least in part.60
For aiding and abetting genocide, knowledge of genocidal intent suffices.
It remains unclear, however, exactly what the appropriate mental standard
for other types of complicity in genocide comprises. The rather enigmatic
phrase that ‘there is authority to suggest that complicity in genocide, where
it prohibits conduct broader than aiding and abetting, requires proof that
the accomplice had the specific intent to destroy a protected group’,61 stated in
56 Krstic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, x140.
57 Judgment, Blagojevic¤ & Jokic¤ (IT-02-60-T),Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2005, x782.
58 J.C. Smith, Smith & Hogan. Criminal Law (8th edn., London/Edinburgh/Dublin: Butterworths,
1996), at 130; Att.-Gen. Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 2 All ER 684, at 686.
59 For a description see Mettraux, supra note 41, 263^265 and L.J. van den Herik and
E. van Sliedregt, ‘Ten Years later, the Rwanda Tribunal still faces Legal Complexities: Some
Comments on the Vagueness of the Indictment, Complicity in Genocide, and the Nexus
Requirement forWar Crimes,17 Leiden Journal of International Law (2004) 537^557, at 544^551.
60 In a recent national trial where a Dutch national was accused of supplying chemicals to
Saddam Hussein and prosecuted for aiding and abetting genocide, the judges applied these
findings as ‘sufficiently developed’ and ‘settled in law’ [author’s translation]. District Court,
The Hague, 23 December 2005, LJN:AU8685 (not yet reported). (http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/
zoeken/dtluitspraak.asp; visited 13 February 2006). For a commentary on the case, see
H.G. van der Wilt, ‘Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic
Jurisdiction’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006) 239^257.
61 Krstic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, footnote 247.
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a footnote in the Krstic¤ appeal judgment and reiterated in the Milos evic¤
Acquittal Decision,62 leaves the issues of complicity in genocide unresolved.
C. JCE and Aiding and Abetting
The Tadic¤ Appeals Chamber distinguished between aiding and abetting and
common-purpose/JCE liability.63 This distinction has been upheld in subse-
quent law, and it is now generally accepted that aiding and abetting and JCE
are distinctive modes of liability; the latter connotes a close involvement in the
commission of a crime and the former constitutes mere facilitation. The fact
that JCE liability has been termed co-perpetration or joint perpetration, where
participants share the intent of the physical perpetrator, results in the overall
understanding that, unlike aiding and abetting genocide, participants in a First
or Second Category JCE have genocidal intent themselves. The issue is more
contentious, however, with regard to Third Category JCE where dolus eventualis
suffices as the requisite mens rea.
D. The Purpose Element
Much has been said and written on the structure of genocidal intent. This
discussion will not be repeated here, yet the following remarks should be
made. In a purpose-based approach, genocidal intent is an additional subjective
element of the crime, which characterizes an act as genocide. Genocidal intent,
thus, consists of two mental elements. First, the additional subjective element,
or ‘purpose-element’ (‘intent to destroy . . .’), which is comprised in the
chapeau of the provision and, second, general mens rea, which is the pendant
of the actus reus of the genocidal act, for instance killing.
Two positions exist with regard to genocidal intent, as aforementioned.
One would be to argue that genocidal intent invariably requires proof that
the individual had ‘an intent to destroy . . .’. As Mettraux argues, ‘the chapeau
element should be met individually’.64 The Trial Chambers in Stakic¤
and Br danin adopted the same position when holding that knowledge
of the principal’s genocidal intent is not sufficient to be held responsible for
a genocidal offence.65
The other position would be to maintain that the aider and abettor or parti-
cipant in a JCE does not need to have genocidal intent himself. He can be held
liable for genocide when there is proof that his knowledge or dolus eventualis
extends to (i) the genocidal act and (ii) the principal’s genocidal intent. The
dolus eventualis test would require a participant to have knowledge of the
genocidal intent and to willingly take the risk that such intent may ‘materi-
alize’. The purpose element could thus be satisfied by ‘knowledge of intent’.
62 Milos evic¤ Decision on Acquittal, supra note 40, x 248.
63 Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, x 229.
64 Mettraux, supra note 41, at 259.
65 Stakic¤ Judgment, supra note 37, x530. Br danin Judgment, supra note 25, x 29.
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This was accepted by the Appeals Chamber in Br d anin and the Trial Chamber
in the Milos evic¤ Rule 98bis decision.
There is support for the second position in national law, which, in turn,
could be a source of international law and an authority for the Tribunals
to rely on.66 However, before any useful comparative law study can be
undertaken on this point a few issues should be clarified with regard to the
nature of JCE. This requires deconstructing JCE and analysing the individual
constituents.
5. Deconstructing JCE
A. Anglo-American Law Origins
To fully understand the concept of JCE, and address the controversies the
concept evokes, one needs to examine the structure of Anglo-American
accomplice liability/complicity and the civil law concept of co-perpetration.
Both liability theories lie at the basis of the JCE concept. With regard to
accomplice liability/complicity, it suffices to cite Kadish:
The secondary party’s liability is derivative, which is to say, it is incurred by virtue of a
violation of law by the primary party to which the secondary party contributed. It is not
direct, as it would be if causation analysis were applicable. That is ruled out by our concept
of human action, which informs much of complicity doctrine. Volitional actions are the
choices of the primary party. Therefore they are his acts, and his alone. One who ‘aids or
abets’ him to do those acts, in the traditional language of the common law, can be liable for
doing so, but not because he has thereby caused the actions of the principal or because the
actions of the principal are his acts. His liability must rest on the violation of law by the
principal, the legal consequences of which he incurs because of his own actions.67
The structure of Anglo-American complicity, with a perpetrator who
most immediately or directly causes the actus reus, and an accomplice,
whose responsibility derives from that of the principal, has its limits.68 Take,
for instance, the following situations: (1) each participant makes a direct causal
contribution to an element of the actus reus and (2) only the act of one causes
the actus reus while both participants share the mens rea. An example of
the first situation is the case where each of the joint principals stab P,
66 See Triffterer, supra note 55, 403^404. In Dutch law a participant could be held responsible for
a principal’s special intent by way of dolus eventualis. See M.M. van Torenburg, Medeplegen (Co-
perpetration) (Tilburg: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1998), at 113; Noyon-Langemeijer-Remmelink,
Wetboek van Strafrecht (Code of Criminal Law ç A Commentary) suppl. 121, Art. 47, Dutch
Penal Code, x 25. See also references in Krstic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 36, x141.
67 S.H. Kadish, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine’,
73 California Law Review (1985), 323 et seq., 337.
68 See for a discussion on the relationship between causation and complicity: K.J.M. Smith,
A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (Oxford: OUP, 1991), at 69; Kadish,
supra note 67, at 333; H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honore¤ , Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1959).
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who dies of the combined effect of the wounds, and each is liable for his own
act and, to the extent of his own mens rea, each can be considered a principal.69
An example of the second situation is A and B setting out to murder P, but it is
A who actually carries out the plan. Both A and B can be considered joint
principals.70
The strict principal^accomplice structure is not well suited to deal
with situations in which A and B are joint principals where each make an
essential causal contribution to an element of the actus reus.71 The doctrine
of common purpose or JCE compensates for this ‘deficiency’ in Anglo-American
complicity law by not requiring an exact identification of the causal contribu-
tions that led to the offence(s), but rather leaving them under the cover of ‘joint
enterprise’ or ‘common-purpose’.72 Common- purpose/JCE liability is based on
the principles of accomplice liability where the responsibility of the one is
derived from the causal contribution of the other and where joint ‘principals’
are each liable for their joint acts and are punished for the principal crime.73
It still is derivative liability: where a person fulfils some of the actus reus
elements himself. In other words, a person’s liability for the crime must rest
in part on the conduct of another.74 The distinction between a joint principal
and an abettor may, however, be difficult to identify. According to Smith
and Hogan, this distinction is immaterial; it does not matter in which
capacity one commits a crime, as perpetrators and secondary parties are
equally liable.75
The common-purpose/JCE doctrine introduces a ‘foreseeable risk’ test and
brings within the scope of complicity the acts committed by a principal who
goes of on a frolic of his own. This is why the concept was relied upon in the
Tadic¤ case with regard to the Jaski¤ ci murders. This type of ‘collateral’ or
extended liability is based in English law on the rule that when A and B share
the common purpose of committing an offence, B is also liable for a crime
which he did not intend, assist, or encourage A to commit, if he knew that
A might do the act while committing the ‘agreed crime’.76 The criminal liability
lies in participating with foresight.77 This test is similar to the reckless
69 Smith & Hogan, supra note 58, at 147.
70 It was held in Rook that the same principles apply to a party who is absent as to one who is
present, [1993] 2 All ER 955, at 130. After all, the absent party may well be the ‘mastermind’
and the most culpable party. Smith & Hogan, supra note 58, at 147.
71 Smith, supra note 68, at 80, footnote 101.
72 Ibid., at 209^234.
73 Smith and Hogan, supra note 58, at 147.
74 See Kadish, supra note 67, at 344^345, n. 36.
75 Smith and Hogan, supra note 58, at 127^129.
76 Smith, supra note 68, at 209 and Smith and Hogan, supra note 58, at 148, referring to the
decision of the Privy Council in ChanWing-Sing v. R. (1985) 80 Cr App Rep 117: ‘(The principle)
turns on contemplation . . .. It meets the case of a crime foreseen as a possible incident of the
common unlawful enterprise. The criminal culpability lies in participating in the venture with
that foresight’.
77 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003), at 434.
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knowledge test of complicity liability in English law78 and is not very different
from the mental standard for aiding and abetting at the ICTY, where one can
be held liable for aiding and abetting a crime of which one is aware that it
‘will probably be committed’.79
JCE liability, as developed and applied in international case law, can be seen
as compensating for the deficiencies of Anglo-American inspired complicity
law. It fulfils the same function as common purpose liability in national
law and as common design liability in post Second World War case law.80
It introduces a group responsibility concept that offers a way out of complicated
causality problems in mob violence situations.
B. Civil Law Origins
Co-perpetration or joint perpetration is recognized as a separate ground of
liability in most civil law systems. Joint perpetration, such as the German
‘Mitta« terschaft’, the Belgian ‘coaction’, or the Dutch‘medeplegen’are distinguished
from complicity by requiring more than mere facilitation.81 Co-perpetration
connotes full cooperation in the crime. In those systems that recognize
two types of accomplices ç co-perpetrators and facilitators ç it has proved
difficult to distinguish between the two. Yet, this is vital, since facilitators,
who have a subsidiary status as helpers, are punished less severely than
co-perpetrators. French law, like Anglo-American law, has struggled to accom-
modate the notion of co-perpetrator or ‘coauteur’ because of the derivative
nature of its complicity theory, based on the notion of ‘emprunt de penalite¤ ’.82
Under the 1810 Code, the accomplice was punished as a principal, while under
Articles 121^7, the accomplice is now punished as if he were the principal.
‘Coauteurs’ are distinguished from accomplices in that they are liable in their
own right. The difference between ‘coauteurs’ and accomplices is that the
‘coauteur’ is considered to have performed the acts, which constitute the offence,
whereas the accomplice has performed mere ancillary acts with a view to
78 In DPP for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell ([1978] 3 All ER 1140), a reckless knowledge test was
introduced for complicity. As to the mental element of the accomplice, it suffices that he
‘[k]nows that one or more of a group of offences is virtually certain to be committed, which
means that in relation to the one(s) actually committed there was knowledge only of a risk
that it would be actually committed ç and that amounts to recklessness’. Ashworth, supra
note 77, at 442.
79 Judgment, Furundz jia (IT-95-17/1-T),Trial Chamber II, 10 December 1998, x 246.
80 See x 2 above. As one commentator said, ‘[a]s distinct from common crimes, international
crimes are almost always committed not by one person, but by several or many persons ç a
group, a band, a clique’. See A.N. Trainin, Hitlerite Responsibility under International Law
(London: Hutchinson & Co, 1944), at 79. See also D. Cohen ‘Beyond Nuremberg: Individual
Responsibility for War Crimes’ in C. Hesse and R. Post (eds) Human Rights in Political
Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia (NewYork: Zone Books, 1999), at 53^92.
81 Mitta« terschaft, Art. 25(2) German Penal Code, Coaction, Art. 66 Belgian Penal Code,
Medeplegen, Art. 47(1) Dutch Penal Code.
82 F. Desportes and F. Le Gunehec, Le Nouveau Droit Pe¤ nal (7th edn., Paris: Economic, 2000), x566,
at 494.
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assisting the offence.83 In essence the ‘coauteur’ is a secondary party, just like
any other accomplice.
It is clear, then, that while First and Second Category JCE are most obviously
rooted in civil law systems, Third Category JCE has equivalents in civil law
systems as well, albeit not as readily recognizable. In Dutch law, Third
Category JCE would qualify as co-perpetration since the mens rea for criminal
participation, including co-perpetration, comprises dolus eventualis.84 Other
civil law systems provide for Third Category JCE equivalents in concepts that
penalize membership of a criminal organization.85 While JCE differs in nature
from the latter concepts, some of the principles underlying ‘membership
responsibility’ may be seen to reflect the essence of JCE.
The summary overview above indicates that co-perpetration as a separate
mode of liability at the Tribunals is rooted in the civil law system. By now the
term co-perpetrator has been accepted in ICTR/Ycase law, as is the view that it
generally connotes a more serious contribution to the commission of a crime
than mere aiding and abetting.86 However, there is still discussion as to the
nature of JCE. Is it derivative or primary responsibility? While certain termi-
nology has been adopted ‘by convenience’, there is no common understanding
on this issue. It suffices at this point to conclude that First and Second Category
JCE clearly have a civil law pedigree while Third Category JCE, or at least its
principles are not alien to civil law systems.
6. Reconstructing JCE
On the one hand, Judge Hunt was right when he found that JCE liability is
a type of accomplice liability and that participants in a JCE are in reality
accomplices. On the other hand, those whose views he disputed, who
maintained that JCE is co-perpetration, were also right. This is so since JCE is
a merger of common law and civil law. JCE in international law is a unique
(sui generis) concept in that it combines and mixes two legal cultures/systems.
The fact that JCE is composed of elements originating from different legal
cultures and applied by persons from varying legal backgrounds may account
83 J.S. Bell et al., Principles of French Law (Oxford: OUP, 1998), at 238.
84 Dutch Supreme Court, 20 January 1998, NJ (Dutch Law Reports) 1998, 426.
85 French law penalizes ‘participation in a group formed or an understanding reached for the
perpetration of one of the felonies specified in Arts 211^1, 212^1, and 212^2 (genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, EvS), when evidenced by one or more overt acts’, Art. 212^3,
x 1 Code Pe¤ nal [Translation: The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, Vol. 31: France (1999)].
See also Desportes and Le Gunehec, supra note 82, at 461. Moreover, the French concept of
‘association de malfaiteurs’ ç a concept that inspired the drafters of the Nuremberg Statute to
penalize membership of a criminal organization ç has been equally devised to deal with mob
violence by overcoming causality problems, Arts. 450^1 to 450^4 of the Code Pe¤ nal. Dutch
law provides for an analogous concept in Art 140 of the Dutch Penal Code. [Translation:
The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes,Vol. 30: The Netherlands (1997)].
86 Krnojelac Appeal Judgment, supra note 22, x 75; Kvoc ka Appeal Judgment, supra note 23,
xx 87^92.
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for the misapprehension and differing views that exist with regard to JCE.
That is why an attempt will be made in the following text to see JCE in its
constituent, national parts, and to understand its application in international
law and its position within the bigger picture, viz. criminal participation in
international criminal law.
A. Scope
In an attempt to reconstruct JCE, one needs, first of all, to realize how JCE
differs from aiding and abetting. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic¤ ruled that to
be an aider and abettor one must carry out acts that are specifically directed to
assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific
crime. In contrast, in the case of JCE, it is sufficient for the co-perpetrator to
somehow contribute to furthering the common plan or purpose. This lower
standard of participation, the objective element, is offset by the fact that
liability under the JCE theory requires a criminal plan, or common design.87
With aiding and abetting, the principal may not even know of the contribution
of the aider and abettor.88
The ‘common-purpose/plan element’ is JCE’s distinctive feature, making it
a more serious contribution to a crime than aiding and abetting and capable
of compensating for the lack of physical/tangible involvement in the actual
commission of the crime. In the Tribunals’ case law there have been attempts
to interpret the ‘plan element’ beyond its original understanding, i.e. an agree-
ment between a ‘physical’ and a ‘non-physical’ perpetrator. By expanding
JCE to include those who plan crimes at a senior level, far removed from
the scene of the crimes, such interpretations are essentially developing JCE
into a surrogate conspiracy concept. The underlying rationale of the Trial
Chamber’s ‘explicit agreement requirement’ in Br d anin was to dismiss such an
understanding of JCE.
The common purpose links the physical perpetrator to the non-physical
perpetrator and provides the basis for attributing individual criminal
responsibility. It requires participants in a JCE to either share the intent in
pursuing the common purpose, or to foresee the crime as a natural
consequence of the common purpose.89 Satisfying these ‘subjective elements’
would require an identification of the members of the JCE. However, this has
proved to be problematic in practice. Inferring intent by way of circumstantial
evidence has been the preferred solution. The Trial Chamber in Krajis nik
clarified the law on this point by requiring that persons in a criminal enter-
prise must be shown to act together.90 From such joint action the element of a
common objective may be inferred.
87 See also Gustafson, supra note 24, at 9^10.
88 Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, x 229
89 Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, x 204.
90 Krajis nik Judgment, supra note 11, at x 834.
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Haan rightfully points out that there is an inconsistency between JCE in
theory and in practice.91 For prosecutors, not much is required to satisfy
JCE’s subjective elements of a common plan and mens rea. It suffices to point
at the inference test applied to Second Category JCE. Moreover, recent
attempts to limit JCE’s expansive scope by imposing additional conditions for
participation92 result in overemphasizing the objective element. This way the
objective^subjective balance of JCE has been reversed. The threshold for actus
reus is increased while the mens rea threshold is very low.93 Against that back-
ground, the ‘express agreement requirement’ proposed by the Trial Chamber in
Br d anin should be welcomed.94 It limits the scope of JCE whilst restoring the
proper subjective^objective balance, bringing JCE closer to its original
meaning.
B. Nature
Any attempt to identify the nature of JCE liability would first require
determining what JCE is not. JCE is not a ‘preparatory’ crime like conspiracy.
Moreover, participating in a JCE is a route to the commission of a crime.95 It is
not a crime in itself as was suggested by the Trial Chamber in Kvoc ka and
corrected on appeal.96
The confusion regarding the nature of JCE liability evolves around whether
JCE liability constitutes a form of perpetration or participation. Resolving this
confusion is particularly relevant when one attempts to answer the question
whether JCE can be a basis for genocide convictions. Unlike participants,
perpetrators are required to have genocidal intent themselves.
The different views that exist on the nature of JCE liability may be explained
as a problem of misleading terminology. The term co-perpetrator suggests that
a participant in a JCE is a principal rather than a participant who commits
rather than participates in a crime. Illustrative of this point is the ruling in
the Krnojelac case, where the Trial Chamber held that participating in a JCE
could not be brought under ‘commission’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) of
the ICTY Statute since that notion was reserved for the principal physical
perpetrator of the crime.97
Another reason for the perpetration-participation confusion is possibly the
divergent position in various national legal systems. In Anglo-American law,
JCE liability is a form of criminal participation. The French legal system adopts
91 Haan, supra note 19, at 194^195.
92 For instance, by requiring the accused to make a substantial contribution to the JCE. Kvoc ka
Appeal Judgment, supra note 23, x 278.
93 Haan, supra note 19, at 195.
94 See for another view, Gustafson, supra note 24.
95 Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction ç Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Milutinovic et al. (IT-99-37-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003, x 20.
96 Kvoc ka Appeal Judgment, supra note 23, x91.
97 Kvoc ka Judgment, supra note 18, x73. Corrected in Kvoc ka Appeal Judgment, supra note 23, x73.
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a similar approach.98 In German law, however, the ‘Mitta« ter’ is considered
a perpetrator.99 In Dutch law, a ‘medepleger’ qualifies as a participant. 100 The
Tribunals, composed of international lawyers of various nationalities, have
adopted differing conceptions of perpetration^participation.
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic¤ seems to have adopted the Anglo-American
approach, which is hardly surprising bearing in mind JCE’s origin. It held that
‘[t]he commission of one of the crimes envisaged in Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the
Statute might also occur through participation in the realization of a common
design or purpose [emphasis added]’.101 As a result, JCE should be regarded
as a form of criminal participation ç a more neutral term than accomplice
liability ç to which principles of derivative liability apply. This is also in
line with JCE’s customary law status. The post Second World War concepts of
‘being concerned in’ or ‘participating in a common design’ generated a body of
case law on which JCE liability was modelled. Past and present international
practice indicates that JCE is based on Anglo-American principles and has been
applied as such.
Considering JCE as a form of criminal participation would not ignore the
concept’s civil law origins. This is so because civil law does not exclude brand-
ing co-perpetration as participation; moreover, JCE is a more serious degree of
liability than aiding and abetting. It is worth recalling here Spencer’s com-
ments to Chan Wing-Siu v. R.102 This was a case before the Privy Council,
where three men were convicted of murder while it was not clear who had
stabbed the person but all were found guilty because the crime was thought to
be ‘within their contemplation’. Spencer admits that the strict rule of within
contemplation/common purpose is not sensible ‘[f]or those who furnish minor
assistance’.103 Indeed, the ‘civil law correction’ to JCE liability, bringing with it
the categorization of aiding and abetting as a less serious contribution to the
commission of a crime, is a welcome contribution to the participation model in
international law.
The preceding account concludes that:
(i) JCE liability has developed into a sui generis concept with elements
derived from both civil law and Anglo-American law.
(ii) It most closely resembles the Anglo-American doctrine of common
purpose and, as affirmed in past and present international case law, has
been applied as such. As a result it should be regarded as a form of
criminal participation to which principles of derivative liability apply.
98 Article 121^6 Code Pe¤ nal. H. Angevin and A. Chavanne (eds), Juris-Classeur pe¤ nal
(Paris: Juris-Classeur, 1998) Complicite¤ , Art. 121^6 et 121^7, Introduction, A et B, 1 a' 16.
99 x 25(2) StGB. H.H. Jescheck and T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil
(5th edn., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1996), 645^646.
100 Article 47(1) sub 1 Dutch Penal Code. Noyon-Langemeijer-Remmelink, supra note 65, Art. 47,
x 1a., at 324a^326a.
101 Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, x 188.
102 [1984] 3W.L.R. 677.
103 J.R. Spencer,‘On Contemplating the Range of Contemplation’, 44 Cambridge Law Journal (1985),
at 10.
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(iii) JCE creates a perpetrator status for those closely involved in the com-
mission of an international crime, which constitutes a higher degree of
culpability than aiding and abetting. In that sense it takes after civil law
co-perpetration.
(iv) JCE’s central element and distinctive feature is the requirement of
a common plan and/or purpose. JCE liability requires a lower degree
of participation than aiding and abetting, which is offset by proof
of a shared intent or plan/common purpose.
(v) The ‘common plan’ element, being the central element of JCE liability,
should be strictly construed to prevent it from becoming elusive.
7. Reconciling JCE and Genocide
We can now return to the question posed in the introduction: can JCE be
a basis for genocide convictions? The answer would be: yes, but a conditional
yes. JCE and genocide can only be reconciled when JCE is applied as a form
of criminal participation.
A. Derivative Liability
Having determined that JCE is a form of criminal participation, which is
governed by principles of derivative liability, it is only a small step to accepting
that it can be applied to special intent crimes such as genocide (including
its extended form). Just like aiding and abetting, no proof is required
that the participant had genocidal intent himself or herself before a genocide
conviction can be entered. This means that participating in a JCE to
commit genocide may be established by being aware of the principal’s
genocidal intent and nevertheless continuing to engage in, what turn out to
be, genocidal activities. Proof of foresight suffices. This was the reasoning
behind the Appeals Chamber decision in Br d anin, endorsed by the Trial
Chamber in Milos evic¤ ,
104 when it held that Third Category JCE is no different
from any other form of criminal participation and therefore does not require
proof of full intent to commit a crime.105
How then can the seemingly inherent incompatibility in combining dolus
specialis and dolus eventualis be solved? Again, the analogy with aiding and
abetting is helpful. Participatory liability almost by definition combines mental
elements that exist on different levels.106 In trying to solve this incompatibility,
104 Milos evic¤ Decision on Acquital, supra note 40, x 291.
105 Br danin InterlocutoryAppeal Decision, supra note 39, x7.
106 An aider and abettor does not share the intent of the principal. He or she must (i) be aware of
the essential elements of the crime committed by the principal offender, including the prin-
cipal’s mens rea and (ii) further know that his or her own acts assisted in the commission of
the specific crime in question. See Krnojelac Judgment, supra note 16, x 88^90 and R. Dixon
et al., Archbold International Ciminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2003), x10^15.
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the mental elements should be seen as distinct. Participatory liability has its
own mental element through which the mental element of the underlying
crime is established. To suggest that combining JCE and genocide would be
‘conflating’ dolus eventualis and ‘watering down’ dolus specialis107 would be to
merge these two elements into one. It is worth reiterating Judge
Shahabuddeen’s dissenting opinion to the Br danin appeal judgment:
In my respectful interpretation, the third category of joint criminal enterprise mentioned
in Tadic does not dispense with the need to prove intent; what it does is that it provides
a mode of proving intent in particular circumstances, namely, by proof of foresight in those
circumstances. (. . .)
The third category of Tadic does not, because it cannot, vary the elements of the crime; it is
not directed to the elements of the crime; it leaves them untouched. The requirement that
the accused be shown to have possessed a specific intent to commit genocide is an element
of that crime. The result is that that specific intent always has to be shown; if it is not
shown, the case has to be dismissed.
I do not think that Tadic spoke differently. The case, as I appreciate it, concerned not the
principle of having to show intent, but a method of doing so. It is only the method that
is being referred to when it is said that the case established a mode of liability.108
B. Purpose Element
Some have argued that genocidal intent, as an additional subjective element, is
such a distinctive element of the crime that it always requires proof of ‘intent to
destroy . . .’, also when it concerns criminal participation. The other position,
advocated earlier, would be that a special intent crime like genocide is still
governed by general principles of derivative liability and that genocide can be
committed by relying on the mens rea and actus reus of criminal participation.
This means that the special-intent/special-purpose element may be proved
through a knowledge or foresight test. Both positions adopt the purpose-
based approach to genocide; they differ, however, on the question of how
genocidal intent should be proved. While a more in-depth comparative law
study would be welcome on this issue, it is safe to assume at this point that
there is authority in national and international law to support the Appeals
Chamber findings in Krstic¤ and in Ntakirutimana as to aiding and abetting
genocide and in Br danin as to Third Category JCE and genocide. A participant
in genocide does not need to have genocidal intent himself or herself before
a conviction for genocide can be entered.
C. Knowledge-based Approach
Introducing a knowledge or foresight test for genocide by way of criminal
participation differs from Kress’ knowledge-based approach. The latter’s
107 Stakic¤ Judgment, supra note 37, x530.
108 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, Br danin Interlocutory Appeal Decision, supra
note 39, x 2, 4^5.
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knowledge-test is based on a redefinition of the crime of genocide; the present
approach follows from a reconstruction of JCE. As a result, his test constitutes
a much lower threshold for proving genocidal intent than the one propounded
above. Kress’ test is satisfied with proof of knowledge of a collective attack that
is aimed at destroying a certain group.109 In other words, a participant
may be held liable for genocidal acts committed by ‘anonymous’ principals. The
JCE/participation approach, however, would still require a relationship between
the participant and the principal perpetrator. Essentially, what the latter
approach purports to do is adopt a knowledge-based approach to participation
in genocide. It is a knowledge test that is only applicable within the constraints
of derivative liability, which requires a direct link between co-perpetrators.
D. Culpability
What remains to be settled when reconciling JCE and genocide is the differen-
tiation within the concept of JCE.Where First and Second Category JCE require
participants to have genocidal intent themselves, participants in a Third
Category JCE would ‘only’ have dolus eventualis with regard to genocidal
intent. It is unsatisfactory that the latter would be put on a par with partici-
pants in First or Second Category JCE with regard to genocide convictions. To
express the difference in culpability, and to further draw on the analogy with
aiding and abetting, it is proposed here that participants in a Third Category
JCE should be held responsible for participating in genocide, which attracts a
lower sentence than committing genocide as a participant in a First, or Second
Category JCE. Third category JCE liability would, however, still be higher on the
scale of culpability than aiding and abetting genocide.
8. Conclusion
Convictions for genocide based upon the application of Third Category JCE
are justifiable. This contention is based on the premise that JCE is a form of
criminal participation to which principles of derivative liability apply. It follows
from this premise that genocide can be committed by relying on the mens rea
and actus reus of the particular form of criminal participation, be it aiding
and abetting or participating in a JCE, to fulfil the mens rea requirement of
the underlying crime. The special-intent/special-purpose element may thus
be proved through a knowledge/foresight test. Such an approach is only valid
when JCE is stripped to its core and applied as it was intended by the Appeals
Chamber in Tadic¤ .110 To mark the distinction between the basic and the
109 Kress, supra note 42, at 577.
110 This author does not agree with the Trial Chamber’s findings in the Krajis nik case (supra
note 11) where JCE was applied to a large-scale enterprise with a changing purpose and
differing membership. Such interpretation makes the central element of JCE liability,
a ‘common plan’, elusive.
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extended form of JCE with regard to genocide, where participants in the former
have genocidal intent and participants in the latter do not, conviction and
sentence should differ. In the case of Third Category JCE, a participant should
be convicted of participating in genocide rather than of genocide. Such convic-
tion would carry a lower sentence than committing genocide as a participant in
a First or Second Category JCE.
JCE was referred to by the Tadic¤ Appeals Chamber as a mode of liability
‘warranted by the very nature of many international crimes which are
committed not uncommonly in wartime situations’.111 Indeed, war criminality
connotes systematic violence and a plurality of offenders. This type of crimi-
nality, on a large and on a small scale, not only connotes group crime, it also
suggests the existence of a mastermind, pulling the strings behind the scene
of the crime. In the Tribunals’ case law there have been attempts to rely on
JCE for convicting this class of perpetrators. Such attempts should, however,
be faulted. Having examined its origins and position within the model
of criminal interpretation, it is submitted that JCE is not applicable to those
masterminding international crimes.
On which basis, then, should such ‘intellectual perpetrators’ be held
criminally responsible? This is a relevant question since these perpetrators are
most likely to be prosecuted at the international level. One could, first of all,
rely on conspiracy or incitement to commit genocide, concepts that are speci-
fically devised for this type of perpetrator. Relying on conspiracy and/or incite-
ment does require proof of a full genocidal intent. One could of course decide to
rely on JCE, as was done in Milos evic¤ and Br danin. This has the advantage of
the lower dolus eventualis standard but the disadvantage of having to prove a
direct link with the actual perpetrators, which will be difficult bearing in mind
the perpetrator’s senior position.
There is a third option, which requires further exploration: indirect perpe-
tration. The ICC Statute provides for the concept of ‘perpetration through
another person’, encapsulated in Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute.112
‘Perpetration through another person’, or indirect perpetration, presupposes
that the person who actually commits the crime can be used as an instrument
of the individual in the background. The typical case of indirect perpetration,
analogous to the ‘auteur me¤ dia’ in French law,‘mittelbarenTa« terschaft’ in German
law and the doctrine of innocent agency in Anglo-American law, would be to
use a person as an instrument who is not criminally liable himself or herself.113
Indirect perpetration in the ICC Statute, however, is even broader. The
agent/direct perpetrator does not have to be innocent.114
111 Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 4, x191.
112 See, for the concept of ‘perpetration by means (of an agent)’, E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal
Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge/
The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003), at 68^71.
113 See van Sliedregt, supra note 112, at 69^70.
114 The German ‘Tatherrschaft’ theory equally provides for indirect perpetration without an
innocent agent. C. Roxin, Ta« terschaft und Tatherrschaft (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 2000),
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Indirect perpetration is not provided for in the ICTR and ICTY Statutes.
Importing it into Tribunal law would require a progressive judicial develop-
ment of the law. As with JCE liability, the concept of indirect perpetration
would have to be brought under ‘committing’.115 Inserting indirect perpetration
into the liability model of the ad hoc Tribunals would further require the
identification of such a concept as reflecting a ‘general principle of law’ or
customary international law. This calls for a survey of national legal systems
and an examination of the drafts and deliberations with regard to
Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute. Creative law making should, however,
not lead to a violation of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. This commen-
tator would, therefore, urge comparative law research into the concept of
indirect perpetration to see whether such a concept indeed reflects customary
international law and meets the nullum crimen sine lege criteria drawn up by
the Appeals Chamber in the Odjanic case.116
Indirect perpetration would offer an escape from the restraints that
a purpose-based approach to genocidal intent and principles of derivative lia-
bility would impose on prosecuting the mastermind. The latter theories require
the liability of an intellectual perpetrator to be dependant on the collective.
Some have tried to solve this problem by suggesting a redefinition of genocidal
intent; others have adopted a novel interpretation of co-perpetration and JCE.117
A better solution would be to rely on indirect perpetration where such a link
with the collective would not be required. If the collective is considered a mere
tool of the strategic perpetrator, it would make no difference whether they are
guilty of genocide or not. Nevertheless, the intellectual perpetrator would still
need to have genocidal intent. Developing indirect perpetration would have the
additional advantage of letting JCE be what it is, a group crime concept and a
form of derivative criminal responsibility.
242^52, 653^654. So does the Dutch doctrine of ‘functional perpetration’. Dutch Supreme
Court, 23 February 1954, NJ 1954, 378.
115 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, to ‘commit’ means ‘to perpetrate, as a crime’. The same
source defines ‘perpetration’as ‘the act of one committing a crime either with his own hands,
or by some means or instrument or through some innocent agent’. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th
edn., St. Paul, MN 1990), 273 and 1141.
116 Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction ^ Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Milutonovic et al. (IT-99-37-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003, x 21.
117 The efforts of the Trial Chamber in Stakic¤ to develop co-perpetration along the lines of
German criminal law concepts such as ‘mittelbare Ta« terschaft’ should be understood against
that background. Such efforts should be faulted. The Trial Chamber relied exclusively on
German law and failed to examine customary international law and/or general principles of
law while developing a concept that bears no resemblance to JCE as introduced by the Tadic¤
Appeals Chamber. Stakic¤ Judgment, supra note 37, xx741^743.
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